Dans cet article, nous utilisons une m6thodologie qui permet de faire la distinction entre les changements discr6tionnaires et non-discr6tionnaires dans les politiques fiscales provinciales et f6d6rales. Nous trouvons des variations intertemporelles et interjuridictionnelles importantes dans les politiques discr6tionnaires des gouvernements au Canada. Cet article r6vele une asym6trie importante dans la composition des positions fiscales discr6tionnaires. Les politiques fiscales d'6conomies ont tendance A tre domin6es par un "6quilibre" entre les coupures dans les d6penses et l'augmentation des taxes, alors que les politiques fiscales expansionnistes ont 6t6 domin6es en grande partie par les d6penses. Cette asym6trie suggbre qu'il existe un penchant historique pour augmenter la taille du secteur public. La politique fiscale d'6conomie la plus r6cente (1993)(1994)(1995)(1996), tant au niveau f6d6ral que provincial, s'6loigne de cette tendance historique en 6tant largement domin6e par les d6penses.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, Canadian governments at both the federal and provincial levels have introduced policies intended to reduce the size of their budget deficits. A number of approaches have been tried. For example, the Government of Alberta is viewed as having adopted an approach characterized by a rapid reduction in expenditures.
The Government of Saskatchewan, on the other hand, is generally perceived as having relied mainly on tax increases (a perception we question below).
The Government of Ontario has cut both spending and taxes and is therefore taking a more gradual approach to deficit reduction. The federal government has stated a preference for a "balanced ap-jurisdictions and levels of government, is the fact that changes in economic conditions impact government budgets via income-sensitive revenues and expenditures -so-called automatic stabilizers. Thus, although Alberta quickly eliminated its deficit, and indeed has reported substantial budget surpluses for the past few years, the provincial budget has enjoyed the benefits of a robust economy. The federal budget has similarly benefited from relatively strong economic growth and a rapid fall in debt-servicing costs due to the fall in Canadian interest rates. A fundamental problem when describing and evaluating fiscal policy then becomes, how much have deficits been affected by automatic stabilizing forces versus discretionary policy choices?
The purpose of this paper is to identify changes in discretionary fiscal policy by governments in Canada. By so doing, we hope to identify the characteristics of discretionary fiscal policies introduced by the ten provinces and the federal government, and address questions such as: Have the deficit reduction efforts been mainly directed toward expenditure cuts or revenue increases? Or, have governments adopted a more "balanced approach" to deficit reduction? Indeed, once the influence of automatic stabilizers are removed, have Canadian governments introduced any discretionary deficit reductions at all?
In the second section, we discuss the basic methodology we use to address these questions by distinguishing between discretionary and nondiscretionary changes in fiscal policy. In section three we present our calculations of the discretionary changes in provincial and federal government balances over the period 1962 to 1996. We find substantial variation, both across governments and over time, in the use of discretionary budget policy. We also categorize the fiscal stances of the governments in each year according to how "loose" or how "tight" they were, and briefly discuss some of the more well-known discretionary budget changes of some of the provinces and the federal government in light of this categorization.
The characteristics of loose and tight fiscal stances are described and compared in the fourth section. We are specifically interested in the composition of these stances, and in particular whether they are dominated by changes in either expenditures or taxes. This exercise highlights an interesting asymmetry in these characteristics. We find that discretionary fiscal retrenchments in Canada have tended to be characterized by a fairly "balanced" approach between spending cuts and tax increases.
By way of contrast, discretionary fiscal expansions have tended to be largely expenditure dominant. This asymmetry between the characteristics of fiscal retrenchments and fiscal expansions suggests, not surprisingly, a growing role of the government sector in Canada over the period studied.
In the next section, we take a closer look at the deficit reduction policies introduced by Canadian governments over the last four years of our sample period , a period of substantial fiscal retrenchment for most provinces as well as the federal government. We provide measures of what fraction of the total reduction in the deficit during this period was due to policy choices as opposed to favourable economic conditions. We find that for the most part the fiscal retrenchments were indeed due to discretionary policy choices on the part of the governments. With some notable exceptions (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Quebec), these discretionary choices were reinforced by favourable economic conditions that further improved the fiscal balance. What's more, unlike the tendency during previous retrenchments, this period was characterized by an unbalanced approach that favoured expenditure cuts.
In the final section, we summarize and conclude.
MEASURING FISCAL IMPULSES
In this section, we outline the methodology we employ to identify discretionary changes in the federal CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXV, NO. 4 1999 The Characteristics of Fiscal Policy in Canada 485 and provincial government budgets. The methodology is due to Blanchard (1993) , and has recently been applied to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries by Alesina and Perotti (1995 , 1997 ) and McDermott and Wescott (1996 . We then apply the method to data describing the budgets of Canadian governments. 1
Efforts to identify the discretionary component of government budgets all involve some method for removing the influence of movements in output, interest rates, and inflation from budget data. Blanchard (1993) suggests focusing on the primary deficit (the deficit net of debt servicing costs) as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP). As he notes, while not exact, this is a simple and straightforward way of removing the influence of inflation and changes in real interest rates from budget data.
Focusing on the ratio of taxes and expenditures to GDP does not afford an exact adjustment for inflation because inflation can affect the deficit vis-avis GDP if the tax system is not fully indexed. Using ratios to GDP also ignores the influence demographic changes might have on the deficit. However, the impact of inflation and demographics on the budget move slowly enough that they are unlikely to have a substantial impact on an indicator of changes in discretionary fiscal policy from one year to the next.
There are a number of ways to remove the influence of cyclical movements in GDP from budget data (see Blanchard 1993; and Alesina and Perotti 1995) . Many of these require a measure of potential output. One then measures how revenue and expenditures would have changed had output grown at its full, or potential, rate. Subtracting this from observed changes in revenue and expenditures identifies the change in the budget balance that was the result of a cyclical movement in output. The problem with this approach is the difficulty of obtaining measures of potential output; a problem that is especially acute at the provincial level.
To avoid having to use measures of potential output, Blanchard suggests estimating what government program spending and tax revenue would have been in year t had the unemployment rate in year t been the same as it was in year t-1. The difference between these values, and the levels of actual program spending and tax revenue in year t-l, provides us with a measure of discretionary tax and spending changes that occurred in period t. In this way, we can derive a measure of the discretionary change in the primary deficit; what Alesina and Perotti call the fiscal impulse. This is the method we employ; as we will show below, it does a remarkably good job of identifying discretionary changes in fiscal policy relative to an approach based upon estimates of potential output.
Specifically, we estimate, for the federal government and for each province, regressions of the following form: S(t) = o + aITS(t) + a2UR(t) + 0(t) R(t) = 30 + 61TR(t) + 62UR(t) + g(t)
where S(t) = program spending as a fraction of GDP in year t, R(t) = tax revenue as a fraction of GDP in year t, TR(t) and TS(t) = values of trend variables (whose definition we discuss below) in year t, UR(t) = the provincial unemployment rate in year t, and where , and .t are error terms. We then use the estimated coefficients and residuals to generate the level of program spending (S(t)*) and taxation (R(t)*) in period t that would have occurred had the unemployment rate been at the level it was last period: S(t)* = o dTS(t) + 62UR(t-1) + (t) R(t)* = 0 + BITR(t) + B2UR(t-1) + A1(t)
Our measure of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal impulse (FI(t)) is then calculated as:
CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXV, NO. 4 1999 Alesina and Perotti use two linear trends (for periods 1960-75 and 1976-92) in their regressions of S(t) and R(t) on unemployment rates. They do so in order to account for a change in the trend rates of growth in these series. It is also apparent in our data that the trend rate of growth in these series changed over our estimation period . However, the changes differ by province and for spending versus revenue. To account for this, we defined TS and TR as province-specific, non-linear trends derived by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to S(t) and R(t) respectively.2
The data used in our analysis is inclusive of all tax revenue and all program spending, including Budget data are measured on a calendar-year basis using national income accounting conventions.6
Our data allow us to compute a cyclically-adjusted, or discretionary, fiscal impulse for each of 35 years for the ten provinces and the federal government.
Before discussing our impulse calculations in more detail, it is worthwhile to offer a brief evaluation of our methodology by comparing the fiscal impulses derived using this method to those obtained using an alternative approach. 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Source: "GDP Adjusted" from Canada (1997, p. 48 In choosing these cut-off points we must ensure a reasonable trade-off between the requirement that very loose and very tight stances be significantly different from a neutral stance, and the requirement that there are a reasonable number of observations in each fiscal stance category. Thus while Newfoundland had the fewest very tight stances, many of its tight stances implied a larger reduction in the Newfoundland government's deficit-GDP ratio than some very tight stances implied for the deficit-GDP ratio in other provinces. -25 -25 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Prince Edward Island Quebec 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Nova Scotia Ontario 196 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1996 1965 1970 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 Saskatchewan British Columbia -2.53111111 1 -2. -5 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 1990 1995 1965 1970 1975 1980 1988 1990 1996 Federal Government rates reduced the scope for discretionary budget increases (see Kneebone 1998 , for a discussion).
Returning again to have, on average, been noticeably larger than very loose stances. An implication of this is that any quantitative differences in the characteristics of (very) loose and (very) tight stances is likely to be due to qualitative differences in fiscal choices and not to differences in the size of one stance versus another.
The Federal Government
Over the period 1962-96, the largest fiscal impulse of cutting transfers to the provinces and, more important politically, proposed to partially de-index old age pensions. It is not difficult to imagine that the political furor that followed the latter announcement put a chill on further efforts to introduce cuts to social programs as a way of reducing the deficit.9
During the remainder of the Mulroney mandates, the federal government produced small negative "neutral" stances. These small negative impulses are noteworthy because during this period, from 1985 to 1989 inclusive, the federal debt-GDP ratio increased by ten percentage points despite real GDP growth averaging 3.9 percent per year. That the debt-GDP ratio continued to climb during this period is a testament to the size of the deficit at the beginning of this period, as well as the size of the debt-GDP ratio and the level of interest rates the federal government was paying on that outstanding debt. These factors combined to make the neutral discretionary policies of the Mulroney government wholly inadequate for reducing, or even stabilizing, the debt-GDP ratio.
1993 produced the only discretionary increase in the primary deficit during the Mulroney regime; a very loose stance equal to 0.9 percent of GDP. Perhaps not surprisingly, this was an election year.l0
The attack on the federal deficit by the newly elected Changes in discretionary spending and tax revenue are identified in the same way that we identified discretionary changes in the budget. That is, we identify the "expenditure impulse" (El) as:
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where we recall that S(t)* measures the level of program spending (as a fraction of GDP) in period t which would have occurred had the unemployment rate remained at the level it was in period t-1 and S(t-1) measures observed program spending in period t-1. Similarly, we define a "revenue impulse"
(RI) as:
so that FI(t) = EI(t) -RI(t). Averages such as these can be misleading, however, because they can be dominated by outliers. In Table 3 , we report the number of very tight and very loose fiscal stances that were dominated by spending changes or by tax changes. In particular, we Nova Scotia 1969 , 1983 Prince Edward Island 1973 New Brunswick 1978 , 1983 , 1995 Nova Scotia 1981 Quebec 1978 , 1987 New Brunswick 1991 Ontario 1983 , 1994 , 1995 Quebec 1994 Manitoba 1984 Manitoba 1973 , 1989 Saskatchewan 1993 Saskatchewan 1986 , 1991 Alberta 1968 , 1984 , 1994 Federal Government 1977 , 1993 British Columbia 1964 , 1976 , 1984 Federal Government 1979 , 1996 Some well-known deficit reduction initiatives can be identified in this 1993 -94 to 1995 -96 (see Canada 1994 In this section, we examine this most recent fiscal retrenchment in more detail. In particular, we determine the extent to which the fairly substantial decrease in deficit-GDP ratios that occurred over this period, for virtually every government, were due to discretionary actions on the part of the governments, as opposed to the presence of robust economic conditions. We also examine the composition of the fiscal impulses that characterize the fiscal retrenchments, in particular whether the impulses were tax or expenditure dominant. This will allow us to determine whether this most recent fiscal retrenchment shares the tendency of early retrenchments identified in the previous section -namely, was it characterized by a "balanced" approach between spending reductions and tax increases, as was the tendency in the past, or was it more heavily weighted on either the tax or expenditure side?
The 1993 -1996 Discretionary or Non-discretionary?
In Table 5 we present, for each government, calculations of the sum of "observed" fiscal impulses It is important to note as well that the cuts to federal spending include cuts to provincial grants: an amount equal to 1 percent of GDP. Thus, discretionary cuts to federal "own" spending over this period was a rather more modest 1.7 percent of GDP.
A negative value in the "Sum of RI" column indicates that tax revenue as a fraction of GDP was reduced due to discretionary policy choices. In particular, it indicates the fall in the ratio of tax revenue to GDP that would have occurred had the un- 
CONCLUSIONS
Our objective in this paper was to learn more about the nature of the fiscal policy choices of federal and provincial governments in Canada over the period 1962 to 1996. We applied a method suggested by Blanchard (1993) , and recently applied by Perotti (1995, 1997) and McDermott and Wescott (1996) to OECD countries, to distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary changes in the fiscal stance of the governments.
A key insight from our analysis is that over much of the sample period, discretionary fiscal policy in (1961-84 and 1985-96) . Thus the revenue-GDP ratio that Alberta would have realized in period t had economic conditions remained the same as in period t-1 was determined by calculating: R(t)*=%+B1 TRENDI+BTREND2+B3UR(t-1)+B4OIL(t-1)+p (t) where the estimated coefficients came from a similar regression involving UR(t) and OIL(t). The variable OIL is measured as the nominal well-head price of crude oil and equivalents in Alberta (Statistics Canada, various years) deflated by Canada's GDP implicit price deflator.
3CAP and EPF were replaced in 1996 with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). 4Current recipients of equalization, the so-called
